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Since the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
courts have struggled to interpret the new "strong inference" standard for
pleading scienter. In In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation, the
Northern District of California held that the Reform Act, in new section
21(D)(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requires plaintiffs to plead
facts creating "a strong inference of knowing, or intentional misconduct" and
that allegations of motive and opportunity are insufficient to satisfi the "strong
inference" standard This Comment analyzes the court's decision in Silicon
Graphics from a statutory construction perspective. The author argues that the
court's interpretation of the Reform Actplaced too much reliance on inconsistent
and ambiguous legislative history, while ignoring text and structure. As a result,
the author contends, the court's opinion provides an "imbalanced" standardfor
pleading scienter-one which erects too great of a barrier to meritorious fraud
claims. The author concludes by proposing an alternative interpretation of
section 21D(b)(2), which is not only faithful to the text, structure, and legislative
history of the Reform Act, but is also consistent with the purposes behind the
federal securities laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
Enacted in December of 1995, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 19951 (Reform Act) has been touted as the most sweeping revision of the
federal securities laws since the 1933 and 1934 Acts Prompted by evidence of
abuse in private securities lawsuits,3 the Reform Act focused its attention on a
rather narrow category of cases-class action lawsuits alleging securities law
violations
* The author would like to thank Professor Morgan E. Shipman for his helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this Comment. The author would also like to thank his family for their
constant support and encouragement.
1 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
2 See Leonard B. Simon & William S. Dato, Legislating on a False Foundation: The
Erroneous Academic Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33
SAN DmO L. REv. 959, 960 (1996). The Securities Act of 1933 is codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1994). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811
(1994).
3 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 748;
infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
4 See 109 Stat. at 737.
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The Reform Act implemented a number of procedural protections in order to
discourage frivolous litigation.5 One of the most controversial of these protections
is the Reform Act's heightened pleading standards.6 Under new section 21D(b)7
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a plaintiff which alleges that a defendant
made an untrue statement of a material fact or a material omission, must now
"specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading, and [ ] if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.' 8 In addition, in private
securities actions in which a particular state of mind must be proven, the Reform
Act requires that "the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged
to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."9
The Reform Act has brought about a tide of scholarly comment since its
enactment in 1995. Proponents of the legislation have hailed its passage as
substantial progress toward restoring the integrity of federal securities laws,10
while its opponents, particularly the plaintiff's bar, have sharply criticized the Act
for going too far and erecting too great a barrier to meritorious claims.11 Although
it is still too early to predict the full effect of the Reform Act,12 one significant
5 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 35-36, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. 679, 748;
see also infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1994 & Supp. HI 1996).
7 See 109 Stat. at 747.
8 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (Supp. 111996).
9 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1996).
10 See, e.g., Bruce G. Vanyo et al., The Pleading Standard of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in SEcuRrrlEs LMGATION 1997, at 73 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B-1015, 1997) (stating that "[i]n December 1995, Congress
passed an extraordinary statute."). Bruce Vanyo, an attorney with substantial experience
defending technology companies against securities litigation, was a major advocate for the
changes brought about by the Reform Act. See D.M. Osborne, Getting Back at Lerach, THE
AM. LAW., Sept. 1997, at 49-50.
11 See Paul H. Dawes, Pleading Motions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, in SECURiTIES LrrGATION 1996, at 39 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B4-7165, 1996).
12 There has been a great deal of commentary on the initial impact of the Reform Act. See,
e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience, in SECURITIES LrIGATION 1997, at 955 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B-1015, 1997); Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Ten Things
We Know and Ten Things We Don't Know About the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, in SECURIES LIGATION 1997, at 1015 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B-1015, 1997) [hereinafter Grnndfest & Perino, Ten Things]; Richard H. Walker,
Report to the President and the Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in SECUTrmEs LMGATION 1997, at 143 (PLI Corp. L.
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1015, 1997) [hereinafter Walker, Report]; Richard
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effect of the Act is already discernible-the interpretation of its provisions is
generating substantial litigation.13
The "strong inference" requirement for pleading scienter has proven to be the
most troublesome provision of the Reform Act for the courts to apply.14 Although
many courts interpreting the provision have concluded that the Reform Act
merely codifies the pre-Reform Act pleading standard of the Second Circuit, 15 the
strictest standard in existence prior to the Act,16 a few courts have concluded that
the Reform Act's standard is even stricter than the Second Circuit's.
17
H. Walker, Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman US. Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning the Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in SECURMES
LrIGATION 1997, at 273 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1015, 1997);
Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours,
39 ARMIZ. L. REV. 641 (1997).
Thus far, there does not appear to be any substantial change in the volume of litigation as a
result of the Reform Act See Walker, Report, supra, at 175. There has been, however, a
noticeable shift of activity from federal courts to state courts in the post-Reform Act period. See
Grundfest & Perino, Ten Things, supra at 1021; Mike France, Bye, Fraud Suits. Hello, Fraud
Suits, BUS. WK., June 24, 1996, at 127 (noting that the number of securities fraud actions
brought in California state courts has increased five-fold since the Reform Act). As a result of
this shift from federal to state courts, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998). The SLUSA
amends the 1933 and 1934 Acts to provide for federal preemption of certain "covered class
action[s]" involving securities fraud and for mandatory removal of certain "covered class
action[s]" from state court to federal district court. See I § 16(b)-(c).
For the most current information regarding securities fraud litigation under the Reform
Act, including filing statistics, case decisions, settlement information, and securities-related
reports and articles, see The Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (ast modified Feb. 2, 1998)
<http://securities.stanford.edu>.
13 Some commentators immediately predicted the Act would generate litigation "over
virtually every one of its provisions," primarily because of what they perceived as
"ambiguous[ ] draft[ing]" and provisions which "do not fit readily into existing procedural and
substantive law." Walter Rieman et al., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A
User's Guide, 24 SEc. REG. L.1 143, 144 (1996).
14 Although not completely void of application problems, the pleading requirements in
§ 78u-4(b)(1) have not proved as controversial as the "strong inference" requirement. This may
be due to the fact that many courts were applying similar requirements prior to the Reform Act.
See id. at 165.
15 See, e.g., Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (N.D. fI1. 1997); Rehm
v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1251-53 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F.
Supp. 431,438 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceuticals Corp., 927 F.
Supp. 1297, 1311 (C.D. Cal. 1996). For discussion of the pre-Reform Act Second Circuit
standard, see infra Part H1.B.1.
16 See H.R. CONF. REp. NO. 104-369, at 31-32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. 679,748.
17 See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F. Supp. 425, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Powers v. Eichen,
977 F. Supp. 1031, 1038-39 (S.D. Cal. 1997); Voit v. Wonderware, Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363,
373 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 208
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42,48-50 (D. Mass. 1997).
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In In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation1 8 (Silicon Graphics 1), the
Northern District of California broke from themajority position and held that the
Reform Act imposes a stronger standard of pleading scienter than the pre-Reform
Act Second Circuit.19 The court relied heavily on the Conference Committee
Report, as well as the President's Veto Message, to conclude that allegations of
motive and opportunity were no longer sufficient to satisfy the Reform Act's
"strong inference" standard, nor was recklessness sufficient to establish scienter
for purposes of section 10(b).2° Instead, the court held that plaintiffs must now
"allege specific facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior
by defendants.'2 1
Retreating somewhat from its earlier position, the court in In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation2 2 (Silicon Graphics 1) found that plaintiffs
are required to plead facts creating "a strong inference of knowing or intentional
misconduct."23 This time, however, the court expressly recognized that
"deliberate recklessness" is sufficient2 4 The court nonetheless reaffirmed its
earlier position that allegations of motive and opportunity are insufficient to
satisfy the Reform Act's "strong inference" standard.2 5
This Case Comment analyzes the Silicon Graphics decisions and addresses
the court's dynamic approaches to statutory interpretation, which abandon
traditional restraints based on consideration of legislative text, structure, and
purpose. Part 1I reviews the parameters of the section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cause
of action as developed by the courts prior to the Reform Act. Part III provides an
overview of the Reform Act, focusing on the new pleading requirements for
actions brought under section 10(b)26 and Rule l0b-5.27 Part IV outlines the facts
and procedural history handed down by the California district court in the Silicon
Graphics litigation and reviews the holdings and reasoning of the two decisions.
Finally, Part V analyzes the Silicon Graphics litigation, criticizing the holdings
regarding recklessness and pleading scienter under the Reform Act from a
statutory construction perspective. Part V also evaluates the implications of the
Silicon Graphics holdings and criticizes the court's interpretation of section
18 [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,325 at 95,957 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 25, 1996), available in 1996 WL 664639.
1 9 See id at 95,962-63.
20 See id at 95,962.
2 1 Id.
22 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
23 Id. at 757.
24 Id.
25 See id at 756-57. The court may have retreated somewhat from its earlier outright
rejection of motive and opportunity in Silicon Graphics L See infra note 158.
26 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)).
27 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
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21D(b)(2)28 for effectively undermining the purposes of the federal securities
laws. This Comment concludes in Part VI by suggesting an intermediate
interpretation of the Reform Act's pleading standard-one that is more consistent
with the tex purpose, and legislative history of the Reform Act.
II. SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5 PRIOR THE REFORM ACT
Federal securities regulation in this country originated in the aftermath of the
stock market crash of 1929.29 With the purpose of protecting investors and
restoring credibility to the fledging securities markets, 30 Congress passed the
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)31 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act).32
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act is a broad anti-fraud provision which has
proved to be a formidable tool for the protection of investors. Section 10(b)
makes it "unlawful ... [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commissioner may prescribe. '33 By itself,
section 10(b) does not make anything unlawful. However, in 1942, pursuant to its
authority under section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 1Ob-5:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
28 The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 10(b), 109 Stat. 737,
747 (1995).
29 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976); see also James M. Landis,
The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29,30 (1959).30 See Landis, supra note 29, at 30.
31 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994)).
The 1933 Act was enacted to provide a system of full disclosure with respect to public
offerings, to protect against fraud in offers and sales of securities, and to promote honest and
fair transactions. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-5 (1933)).
32 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-7811 (1994)). The purpose of the 1934 Act was "to protect investors against
manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and
in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose
stock is listed on national securities exchanges.' Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195 (citing S. REP.
No. 792, at 1-5 (1934)). The 1934 Act also created the Securities Exchange Commission. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994).
33 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
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circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.3 4
Although neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 by their terms provide for an
express civil remedy for a violation of their prohibitions,3 5 the lower courts beganimplying a private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in 1946.36
The Supreme Court, after years of acquiescence to the practice of the lower
courts, now recognizes the existence of such a private cause of action as firmly
established.37 Today, the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 constitutes an "essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act's
requirements. '38
As would logically be expected of a judicially developed implied cause of
action, questions have inevitably arisen regarding the precise contours of a 10b-5
action.3 9 Although the Supreme Court has occasionally taken the opportunity to
address particular elements of the 10b-5 action,4 ° the Court has often left to the
lower courts the task of hammering out the particulars. This has often resulted in
conflict among the circuits as to the parameters of the lOb-5 action.
A. Recklessness Under Section 1 O(b) and Rule lOb-5
The issue of state of mind in a lOb-5 action has historically caused a great
34 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
35 Nor does it seem that Congress or the Commission contemplated such a private
remedy. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196 ("[Tihere is no indication that Congress, or the
Commission when adopting Rule lOb-5, contemplated such a remedy.").
36 'Me first reported decision implying a private right of action for damages for violations
of§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,514 (E.D. Pa.
1946).
37 See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,230-31 (1988).
38 Id. at 231. Private causes of action constitute the vast majority of cases brought under
§ 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 today. See Kevin R. Johnson, Liabilityfor Reckless Misrepresentations
and Omissions Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
667,669-70 (1991).
39 See Johnson, supra note 38, at 670. The basic elements of a lOb-5 action are generally
accepted as: (1) A misstatement or omission; (2) of a material fact; (3) made with scienter; (4)
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (5) upon which plaintiffrelied; and (5) that
reliance proximately caused the plaintiff injury. See, e.g., Melder v. Morris, 27 F3d 1097, 1100
(5th Cir. 1994); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989).
40 See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 170-92 (1994) (no private
cause of action for aiding and abetting); Basic, 485 U.S. at 230-32 (materiality requirement);




deal of conflict among the lower courts. 41 In the 1960's and early 1970's, a split
developed among the courts of appeals as to whether negligence would suffice for
liability under lOb-5, or whether some form of scienter was required. 42 In 1976,
the Supreme Court answered this question in the landmark case of Ernst & Ernst
v. Hockfelder4 3 The Court held that "scienter"--an "intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud"--was a prerequisite to liability under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5.44 Negligence, according to the Court, was an insufficient basis for
imposing liability under these provisions.4 5
While defining scienter as a "mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud,"46 the Court in Hochfelder refused to address the related
issue of whether "scienter" under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 encompassed
recklessness. 47 The Court left this possibility open when it stated that "[i]n certain
areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for
purposes of imposing liability for some act."48 In effect, the Court left it to the
lower courts to resolve the issue.
Seizing upon the opening left by the Hochfelder opinion, the courts of
appeals addressing the issue have unanimously concluded that a showing of
recklessness is sufficient under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.49 One of the first
cases elaborating on this issue was Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.50
41 For a thorough discussion of the conflict over the definition of recklessness, see
Johnson, supra note 38.
4 2 See Ernst & Emst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,193 n.12 (1976) (comparing cases).
43 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
44 See id. at 193.
4 5 See id. In reaching its decision, the Hochfelder Court placed particular emphasis on the
words "manipulative," "deceptive," and "contrivance" in § 10(b). See id. at 197-99. According
to the Court, these words "strongly suggest that section 10(b) was intended to proscribe
knowing or intentional misconduct" Id. at 197.
46 Id. at 193 n.12.
47 
"We need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless
behavior is sufficient for civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." Id.
48 Id.
49 The courts of appeals that have found recklessness to be sufficient include: Searls v.
Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (7th Cir. 1995); Dannenberg v. Painewebber (In re Software
Toolworks), 50 F.3d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 1994); Melder v. Morris, 27 F3d 1097, 1102 (5th Cir.
1994); Stone v. Kirk, 8 F3d 1079, 1086 (6th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641-
42 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Baeckman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990); Hollinger v. Titan
Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th Cir. 1990); Van Dyke v. Cobum Enter., 873 F.2d
1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (llth Cir. 1985);
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642
F.2d 929, 961 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp.
v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-46 (7th Cir. 1977).
50 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
17471998]
7 OHIO STATELA WJOURANAL
This case involved a section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 action by Sundstrand
Corporation alleging that Sun Chemical Corporation had made
misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts about the performance and
financial condition of Standard Kollsman Industries (SKI) during negotiations
regarding the potential merger of SKI into Sundstrand.51 In holding defendants
liable, the Seventh Circuit expressly recognized that recklessness was sufficient
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 and articulated a definition of recklessness
that has been accepted by a majority of courts:52
[R]eckless conduct... [is] a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely
simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or
sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
have been aware of it.53
The Sundstrand court supported the imposition of liability in Rule lOb-5
actions based on recklessness by analogy to common law actions of fraud and
deceit.54 Because recklessness was sufficient at common law to support actions in
fraud or deceit, 55 the Seventh Circuit found it "inappropriate to construe the Rule
lOb-5 remedy to be more restrictive. 56 Perhaps more important to the resolution
51 See id at 1037. The defendants consisted of SKI, the chairman of the board and
president of SKI, and an outside director of SKI. See id. at 1036-37.
52 Some commentators have suggested that there exists a disagreement when it comes to
defining recklessness. See Johnson, supra note 38, at 685-86 ("Unfortunately, the courts are
substantially less in agreement on the precise meaning of the term 'recklessness."). Without
analyzing the actual application of the recklessness standard by the various circuit courts,
however, it seems that the majority of circuits are in general agreement Whether labeling it
"extreme recklessness," see Steadman, 967 F.2d at 641, "severe reckless," see, e.g., Melder, 27
F.3d at 1102, orjust plain "recklessness," see, e.g., Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1569, the majority of
circuit courts appear to employ the Sundstrand definition of recklessness, or a variation thereof.
See, e.g., Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1995);
Steadman, 967 F.2d at 641-42; Woods, 765 F.2d at 1010; Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1118; Broad,
642 F2d at 961.
53 Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestem Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F.
Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976)). Under this definition, the Seventh Circuit noted, "the danger of
misleading buyers must be actually known or so obvious that any reasonable man would be
legally bound as knowing." Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that its standard was to serve as the
"legally functional equivalent for intent." Id. As another circuit court has stated, it is a standard
only one step down from intent, see Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F3d 1363, 1378 (9th Cir. 1994), and
not just a heightened form of ordinary negligence. See Steadman, 967 F.2d at 641.
54 See Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1044.
55 As one court addressing the issue noted: "[A]t common law, reckless conduct is viewed
as a form of knowing conduct" Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,45 (2d Cir.
1978).
56 Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1044.
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of this issue by the courts, however, was the practical implication of their
decision: "To require in all types of lOb-5 cases that a factfinder must find a
specific intent to deceive or defraud would for all intents and purposes
disembowel the private cause of action under § 10(b). ' '5 7
B. Pleading Scienter Under Section I 0(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
In contrast to the general agreement concerning the sufficiency of
recklessness, there was a sharp conflict among the circuits, prior to the Reform
Act, regarding the pleading requirements in section 10(b) and 10b-5 actions. The
most pronounced conflict could be seen between the Second and Ninth Circuits,
which had adopted the strictest and the most relaxed pleading standards,
respectively.58 As discussed infra Part Im, one of the major purposes of the
Reform Act was to address the conflicting pleading standards among the circuits.
1. The Second Circuit Pleading Standard
Considered to be the most stringent pleading standard prior to enactment of
the Reform Act,5 9 the Second Circuit required a plaintiff in every lOb-5 action to
allege facts in the complaint which "give [ ] rise to a 'strong inference' of
fraudulent intent."60 The Second Circuit recognized two distinct ways that this
"strong inference" standard could be met. First, a plaintiff could "allege facts
establishing a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do so."'6 1 Second, a
57 Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47.
58 Compare In re GlenFed, Inc., Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1993)
("[P]laintiffs may aver scienter generally... simply by saying that scienter existed.") with In re
Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[Tjhe facts alleged in the
complaint must 'give rise [ ] to a strong inference' of fraudulent intent.") (quoting O'Brien v.
National Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991)). While the Second and
Ninth Circuits adhered to the two most extreme pleading standards, a number of other circuits
adopted "intermediate" positions. The First Circuit, for example, adhered to a "reasonable
belief' pleading standard prior to the Reform Act. Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, 959 F. Supp. 42,
48 (D. Mass. 1997). Under the reasonable belief standard, a plaintiff in a securities fraud action
was required to state facts with such particularity as to make it reasonable to believe that the
defendant acted with the requisite scienter. See Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194,
1223-24 (1st Cir. 1996).
59 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,748.
60 In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268 (quoting O'Brien v. National Property Analysts
Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991)). Although the "strong inference" standard was
strict, the Second Circuit did not require that scienter be plead with "great specificity." Id.
61 Id. at 269; see also Powers v. British Vita, P.L.C., 57 F.3d 176, 184 (2d Cir. 1995);
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). Motive requires plaintiff to
allege "concrete benefits that could be realized by one or more of the false statements and
wrongful nondisclosures alleged," while opportunity involves "the means and likely prospect of
achieving concrete benefits bythe means alleged." Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130.
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plaintiff could "allege facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless
or conscious behavior." 62
2. The Ninth Circuit Pleading Standard
In contrast to the '"heightened" level of pleading required by the Second
Circuit 63 the Ninth Circuit's pleading standard mirrored the literal terms of Rule
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.64 Rule 9(b), which provides the
requirements for surviving a motion to dismiss in cases based on allegations of
fraud, provides that "[m]alice, intent knowledge, and other condition of mind of a
person may be averred generally."65 Accordingly, in securities fraud cases, the
Ninth Circuit permitted a plaintiff to aver scienter generally66-- "simply by saying
that scienter existed."67
6 2 In re 2me Warner, 9 F.3d at 269; see also Powers, 57 F3d at 184; Shields, 25 F.3d at
1128. As compared to motive and opportunity allegations, the strength of circumstantial
allegations had to be "correspondingly greater." Powers, 57 F.3d at 184 (citing Beck v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F2d 46,50 (2d Cir. 1987)).6 3 Although the Ninth and Second Circuits disagreed substantially regarding the correct
standard for pleading scienter, the two circuits had similar requirements for alleging the
circumstances of fraud under Rule 9(b). The Second Circuit required complaints to "(1) specify
the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent (2) identify the speaker, (3) state
where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were
fraudulent." Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993). Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit required plaintiffs to "set forth what is false or misleading about a statement and
why it is false, [i.e.,] an explanation as to why the statement or omission complained of was
false or misleading." In re GlenFed, Inc., 42 F.3d at 1548. Commentators have noted that
Congress, in enacting § 21D(b)(1), was adopting the GlenFed standard of pleading. See, e.g.,
William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section 21D(b)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness, and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 893, 894-95 (1996) (noting that the
GlenFed standard differed somewhat from law in some other circuits).64 FED. p. CIV. P. 9(b).
65 Id. The full text of Rule 9(b) reads: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." Id.6 6 A complaint was sufficient if it stated "precisely the time, place, and nature of the
misleading statements, misrepresentations, and specific acts of fraud." Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d
1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994).6 7 In re GlenFed, Inc., 42 F.3d at 1547. According to the Ninth Circuit imposing a
"heightened" pleading standard, as the Second Circuit did, was inappropriate: "We are not
permitted to add new requirements to Rule 9(b) simply because we like the effects of doing so.
This is a job for Congress, or for the various legislative, judicial, and advisory bodies involved
in the process of amending the Federal Rules." Id. at 1546.
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UI. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
Over President Clinton's veto,68 Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in December of 1995.69 The Act was passed in the
wake of what was viewed as a "rising tide of abusive and frivolous securities
litigation."70 The Reform Act was intended to be a fix for a securities litigation
system which many believed was broken,71 and the Act addressed several
perceived procedural pitfalls accordingly.7 2 Although the Reform Act certainly
represented a sweeping revision of the securities laws, many of the most
aggressive revisions were not contained in the text of the Act, but were suggested
in statements contained in its legislative history.73 As a result, the exact meaning
of many of the Reform Act's provisions is not yet clear;, we must wait as the
interpretation process of the courts discerns the Act's true reach.
A. Purposes of the Reform Act
In enacting the Reform Act, Congress was prompted by significant evidence
of abuse in securities litigation.74 As set forth in the Conference Committee
68 See H.R. Doc. No. 104-150 (1995).
69 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
70 Dawes, supra note 11, at 39.
71 See Simon & Dato, supra note 2, at 960.
72 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995).
73 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or,
Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 975 (1996).
74 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995). A significant source of this
evidence apparently came from a study conducted by Janet Cooper Alexander. See Janet
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions,
43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991). From her study of a selection of securities cases, Professor
Alexander concluded that:
(1) "[S]uits were filed against every company in the industry whose stock declined
significantly."
(2) "ITMhe cases settled for approximately one quarter of the potential damages."
(3) "The strength of the plaintiff's case on the merits... did not appear to be a significant
factor in determining the outcomes."
Id. at 500. Professor Alexander's study and statistical analysis, however, has been criticized
recently. See Simon & Dato, supra note 2. Simon and Dato reviewed Alexander's study and
indicated several significant methodological errors. See id. at 966-84 (noting sampling
deficiencies, homogeneity, selective inclusion and exclusion, adjustment and omission of key
data, arithmetic and data errors, and adjustment failures). After repeating Alexander's study and
conducting a "broader" study of their own, Simon and Dato determined that Professor
Alexander's conclusions were erroneous. See id. at 1014-16. Accordingly, Simon and Dato
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Report, Congress had identified four primary abuses:
(1) IT]he routine filing of lawsuits against issuers... whenever there was a
significant change in an issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying
culpability of the issuer, and with only faint hope that the discovery process
might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action;
(2) Mhe targeting of deep pocket defendants ... without regard to their actual
culpability;
(3) [Tjhe abuse of the discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is
often economical for the victimized party to settle; and
(4) [T]he manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they
purportedly represent.
75
In the Reform Act, Congress sought to protect investors, issuers, and the
integrity of capital markets from these abuses. 76 To effect this result, Congress
implemented procedural protections to discourage frivolous suits,77 inter alia: (1)
procedures and restrictions on the selection of lead plaintiffs in securities class
actions,78 (2) settlement disclosure requirements, 79 (3) a "safe-harbor" for
forward-looking statements,80 (4) proportionate liability for certain defendants, 81
(5) mandatory sanctions under Rule 11 for abusive litigation practices, 82 and (6)
have argued that Congress legislated on the basis of false and misleading data. See id. at 962.
75 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995).
7 6 See id. at 32.
7 7 See id.
78 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(l)-
(6) (Supp. II 1996). The Reform Act requires, inter alia, a certificate to be filed with the
complaint, early notice to be given to class members, and a court determination as to who is the
"most adequate plaintiff." Id. The Reform Act makes it a rebuttable presumption that the
plaintiff with the largest financial interest in the relief sought is the "most adequate plaintiff."
See id. The Reform Act also prohibits the lead plaintiff from receiving more than a per share
basis of the recovery. See id.
79 See id § 101. The Reform Act requires disclosure of settlement terms to class members.
See id. This disclosure shall include statements conceming the amount of the settlement, the
potential outcome of the case, the amount of attorneys' fees or costs sought, identification of
attorneys, and reasons for the proposed settlement. See id.
80 See id § 102. The Reform Act prevents the imposition of liability on individuals for
maldng certain forward-looking statements, as long as the statement is identified as a forward-
looking statement and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, is immaterial, or
was not made with actual knowledge that the statement was false or misleading. See id.
81 See id § 210. The Reform Act provides an exemption to the general rule ofjoint and
several liability for qualifying defendants in actions arising under the 1934 Act and actions
under the 1933 Act against outside directors. See id.
82 See id § 101. The Reform Act requires the court to make specific findings regarding
Rule 1 l(b) compliance in every case. See id. The Act also imposes a rebuttable presumption in
favor of attorneys fees and costs for violations of Rule 11(b). See id.
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heightened pleading requirements in securities fraud actions.83
In providing for a heightened pleading standard, Congress attempted to erect
a barrier to "[iunwarranted fraud claims."'84 In essence, Congress saw two
problems with the current pleading system: (1) an increase in the number of
meritless lawsuits being filed and (2) a lack of uniformity in the pleading
standards imposed by various circuits.85 Rule 9(b)'s requirement that plaintiffs
plead allegations of fraud with particularity, according to Congress, had "not
prevented abuse of the securities laws by private litigants." 86 In addition, the
conflicting interpretations of Rule 9(b)'s requirements by the circuit courts had
created different standards.87 This had led to "forum shopping," as private
litigants flocked to the circuits with the least stringent pleading standards. 88 The
Reform Act's heightened pleading standard, therefore, was an attempt to
"establish uniform and more stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing
of meritless lawsuits. '89
B. The Reform Act's New Requirements for Pleading Scienter
The Reform Act provides that when a plaintiff is required to prove in a
securities fraud action that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, "the
complaint shall... state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."90 On its face, this
provision would seem to require, in actions based on section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5,91 that the plaintiff plead facts that give rise to a strong inference of at least
recklessness on the part of the defendant 2
83 See id; see also infra Part III.B.
84 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995). The Statement of Managers recognized the
seriousness of bringing a securities fraud action: "Unwarranted fraud claims can lead to serious
injury to reputation for which our legal system effectively offers no redress." Id.
8 5 See id.
86Id.
8 7 See id. In particular, Congress was concerned with the lack of uniform pleading
requirements for scienter. As discussed Part I1I.B, infra, the greatest disparity in the pleading
requirements for scienter existed between the Ninth and Second Circuits.
8 8 See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
8 9 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at41 (1995).
90 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (Supp. I
1996).
91 The pleading standards under the Reform Act apply to all securities fraud actions
brought under the 1934 Act, and not just § 10(b). Although many of the points made in this
Comment may apply with equal force to other provisions of the 1934 Act, this Comment
focuses primarily on § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions.
92 See Coffee, supra note 69, at 978. Because recklessness has been accepted as sufficient
under § 10(b) by every circuit court addressing the issue, it would seem logical that the
"required state ofmind" would encompass recklessness. See supra note 49.
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The plain language of the Reform Act appears to codify the Second Circuit
standard for pleading scienter.93 The "strong inference" language mirrors the
language employed by the Second Circuit prior to the Reform Act.94 The Second
Circuit pleading standard was recognized as the strictest in existence prior to the
Reform Act,95 and it could be satisfied by (1) alleging facts showing both a
motive and an opportunity for committing fraud, or (2) alleging facts
"constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior."9 6
While a number of courts addressing the issue have concluded that the Reform
Act simply codifies the pre-Act Second Circuit standard,97 the Northern District
of California in Silicon Graphics 198 placed great reliance on the Reform Act's
legislative history and held that the Reform Act erected a standard for pleading
scienter that was stronger than even the Second Circuit's standard.99
IV. THE SILICON GRAPHICS CASES
A. Facts
Silicon Graphics, Inc. (SGI) is a Delaware corporation specializing in the
computer technology industry.100 After SGI's stock reached a record high in
August of 1995, market concern about the company's ability to maintain its
historic growth rates of 40% in the face of increased competition sent SGI's stock
plummeting more than $15 per share.101
In October of 1995, SGI's release of its results for the first quarter of fiscal
year 1996 indicated a 33% growth in revenue, which was viewed as disappointing
by the market.102 SGI assured analysts and investors that it still expected to meet
its growth targets, explained the shortfall, and suggested reasons why second
quarter performance would be better.103 As a result, Silicon Graphic's stock price
93 See, e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. See. Litig., 9 F3d 259,268 (2d Cir. 1993).
94 See id. ("[Flacts alleged in the complaint must [] give rise to a 'strong inference' of
fraudulent intent." (citations omitted)).
95 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995).
96 In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 289.
97 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
98 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
99 See id. at 755-57.
100 See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 99,325, 95,959 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996), available in 1996 WL 664639. The
company designs and sells, among other things, desktop graphics workstations and application
software. Id.
101 See id. SGI's stock hit a high of $ 44-7/8 on August 21 before dipping into the high-
$20 range based on the negative market information. See id.
102 See id.




Based -on rumors in December of 1995, which suggested Silicon Graphics'
second quarter results might again be lower than anticipated, 105 SGI's stock
dipped again, this time into the mid-$20 range. 106 In January of 1996, SGI
confirmed these rumors and the company's stock fell to a low of $22 per share. 107
In response, plaintiff shareholders of SGI filed a class action complaint on
January 29, 1996.108
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff shareholders brought a class action in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, alleging a violation of section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act.109 Plaintiffs alleged that SGI and a number of
named executives of the company had issued "false and misleading information
about the company after the disappointing first quarter, in an effort to inflate the
price of SGI stock for the purpose of selling their own stock at a substantial
profit."1 10 The complaint alleged that defendants devised a scheme to boost stock
prices in order to protect their own interests,111 that defendants made material
misrepresentations about SGI's growth prospects and financial condition, and that
defendants failed to disclose various adverse facts.' 12 In addition, the complaint
alleged that defendants sold over 400,000 of their own shares of company stock
and reaped profits of over $14 million.113 Plaintiff alleged that the scheme caused
financial damage to both the corporation and its shareholders. 114
See id.
104 The stock rebounded into the high $30 range. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746,750 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
105 Silicon Graphics, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,959.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id. The complaint related to the December/January drop in SGI's stock price. See




111 See id. at 95,959. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants were concerned about their own
investments, the reputation of the company's Chairman and CEO, and the company's ability to
use its stock to acquire other companies. See id.
112 See id. Plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to disclose that the company had
insufficient component parts to produce enough of its new workstations to meet demand, and
that defendants disseminated this false and misleading information to the market. See id. at
95,960.
113 See id.
1 1 4 See id.
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Defendant's answered plaintiff's complaint by stating that no fraud was
involved, even though, in hindsight, the company's forecast could be viewed as
optinistic. 115 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),116
arguing that plaintiff's complaint was not alleged with enough specificity to meet
the requirements of Rule 9(b)117 and that plaintiff failed to adequately plead
scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.118
C. Silicon Graphics I
In Silicon Graphics ,1 19 the Northern District of California began its analysis
of the section 10(b) claims with an extensive discussion of the heightened
pleading standard under the Reform Act.120 The court began this discussion by
quoting the "strong inference" language from the Act,121 but all references to the
text of the statute ended there; the court's analysis focused exclusively on the
Act's legislative history. Specifically, the court placed significance on two pieces
of legislative history-the Conference Committee Report122 and President
Clinton's Veto Message 123 -as evincing Congress's 'crystal clear' intent" to
heighten the pleading standard beyond the Second Circuit standard.124
Although the court acknowledged that the Reform Act's heightened pleading
standard was "adapted" from Second Circuit case law,125 the court found that the
Conference Committee Report clearly indicated that Congress did not "simply
codify the Second Circuit standard." 126 Rather, according to the court, "the
Conference Committee Report indicates that Congress intended to strengthen [the
pleading standard]' 127 and that, consequently, Congress expressly chose not to
1 15 See id.
116 See FED. ph CIV. p. 12()(6).
1 17 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
118 Silicon Graphics, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,960.
119Id
.
120 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (Supp. 111996); Part 1I.B, supra.
121 "[he complaint shall ... state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. II
1996).
122 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at41 (1995).
123 H.R. Doc. No. 104-150 (1995).
124 Silicon Graphics, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI-) at 95,962.
125 Id. at 95,961. The court noted that Second Circuit law applying the strong inference
pleading standard permitted a plaintiff to "allege specific facts that either (1) 'constitut[e]
circumstantial evidence of either recldess or conscious behavior,' or (2) 'establish a motive to
commit fraud and an opportunity to do so."' Id. (quoting In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9
F.3d 259,269 (2d Cir. 1993)).
12 6 Id. at 95,961-62.
12 7 Id. This finding was predicated on a sentence in the Statement of Managers that
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adopt "language from the Second Circuit standard relating to motive, opportunity,
and recklessness." 128 The court cited the prior rejection by the Senate of an
amendment that would have expressly codified this language as providing
additional support for this conclusion.129
The court next turned to President Clinton's Veto Message for additional
guidance. One of the President's primary reasons for vetoing the Reform Act
according to his veto message, was that the new act erected a pleading standard
that went beyond that of even the Second Circuit. 130 The President placed great
significance on the Statement of Managers contained in the Conference
Committee Report, which he felt "ma[d]e crystal clear... [Congress's] intent to
raise the standard even beyond [the Second Circuit standard].' 131 Congress's
subsequent override of the President's veto, according to the court, "emphasiz[ed]
its 'crystal clear' intent to heighten the pleading standard."'132
Based on this legislative history, the court in Silicon Graphics Ireasoned that
allegations of motive and opportunity were insufficient to satisfy the Reform
Act's heightened pleading standard.133 In addition, because the Conference
Committee Report specifically rejected language relating to motive, opportunity,
and recklessness, but made no reference to conscious behavior, the court
concluded that Congress must have intended that only evidence of conscious
behavior would be sufficient under the new standard. 134 Accordingly, the court
held that the Reform Act now required plaintiffs to "allege specific facts that
accompanied the Conference Committee Report: "Because the Conference Committee intends
to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's
case law interpreting this pleading standard." Id. at 95,962 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-
369, at41 (1995)).
12 8 Id. This conclusion was based on a footnote to the Conference Committee Report:
"For this reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard certain
language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness." HR. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 n.23
(1995).
12 9 See Silicon Graphics, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
95,962 (citing Amend. 1485, S. 240, 140th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (the Specter Amendment)).
The court stated that the deletion of the Second Circuit standard from the final bill "strongly
militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact"
Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186,200 (1974)).
130 See id. President Clinton indicated that he would support a pleading standard as high
as that of the Second Circuit: "I am prepared to support the high pleading standard of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading standard of any Federal circuit
court." HR. Doc. No. 104-150, at 1 (1995).
131 H.R. Doc. No. 104-150, at 1 (1995).
132 Silicon Graphics, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC) at 95,962.
13 3 See id. ("Congress must have adopted the Conference Committee view and intended
that a narrower first prong apply.'9.
134 Although the court did not expressly state that allegations of recklessness were
insufficient, the implication of its articulation of the standard, which specifically required
evidence of "conscious behavior," was clearly to reject recklessness. See id. at 95,963.
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constitute circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior by defendants. 1 35
In applying the Reform Act's new and more exacting pleading standard to the
plaintiffs' complaint, the court in Silicon Graphics I found the allegations
insufficient. 136 Although the court concluded that plaintiffs had adequately pled
the falsity of most of the statements, sufficiently identifying the time, location,
and content of the allegedly false statements137 and explaining why the
statements were false or misleading,138 the court held that plaintiffs' complaint
failed to adequately plead scienter under the Reform Act's new standard.139
The court in Silicon Graphics I found that plaintiffs' allegations of
defendants' awareness of negative internal reports, coupled with allegations of
misleading statements and stock sales, fell short of pleading a strong inference of
fraud.140 With respect to the negative internal reports,141 the court found that
plaintiffs' allegations were not specific enough in that they failed to specifically
identify, inter alia, the names and dates of the alleged negative internal reports.142
13 5 Id. Under Second Circuit law, a plaintiff could support a strong inference of fraud in
either of two ways. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. Having found that Congress
rejected opportunity and motive as insufficient, the court's standard required a plaintiff to use
the only other method of pleading scienter remaining-specific facts constituting circumstantial
evidence. See Silicon Graphics, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
95,962.
13 6 See Silicon Graphics, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
95,966 ("The Court finds that plaintiff's allegations are not specific enough to raise a strong
inference of fraud!").
137 See id. at 95,965. The court cited Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994),
for the requirement under Rule 9(b) that the complaint "state precisely the time, place, and
nature of the misleading statements, misrepresentation, and specific acts of fraud." Id. The court
noted that this requirement ensured that defendants could "identify who is being charged and
with what" Id.
138 See id. (citing In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 70 F.3d 1541,1549 (9th Cir. 1994)).
139 See id. at 95,967.
140 See id. ("Although plaintiff does not, as defendants assert, simply hold predictions up
against the backdrop of what actually happened, her allegations nonetheless fall short of
pleading a strong inference of fraud.).
141 The plaintiffs' claims regarding alleged negative internal reports were that:
Each of the Individual Defendants was aware of Silicon Graphics' fiscal 1996
forecast and budget and of internal reports, comparing Silicon Graphics' actual results to
those budgeted and/or forecasted. Based on the negative internal reports of the Company's
actual performance compared to that budgeted and forecasted, the Individual Defendants
each knew Silicon Graphics was plagued by an inability to sell, i.e., ship, as many Indigo2
IMPACT Workstations as planned ....
Id. (quoting 30 of plaintiffs' complaint).
142 See id In making this finding, the court relied heavily on the fact, brought to the
court's attention by the defense lawyers, that a number of securities class action complaints
previously filed in U.S. district courts had contained the same "boilerplate allegations of
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From a policy perspective, the court noted that every corporation uses some type
of internal reporting system, and, consequently, to allow plaintiffs "to go forward
with a case based on general allegations of 'negative internal reports' would
expose all those companies to securities litigation whenever their stock prices
dropped."'143 As a result, the court made unmistakably clear that "unsupported
general claims of the existence of internal reports are insufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss." 144
Finally, the court found that, even if plaintiffs could adequately allege
negative internal reports, the alleged stock trading failed to support a strong
inference of fraud because the defendants' stock sales were not "unusual or
suspicious."'145 The court noted that, when the millions of exercisable options
held by defendants were factored into consideration,146 the sales were actually
relatively small and represented "only a small fraction of [defendants'] total SGI
holdings."' 47 In addition, the sales at issue were found to be generally consistent
in amount with sales made in previous quarters.148
Having found plaintiffs' complaint to be insufficient to satisfy the heightened
pleading requirements of the Reform Act, the court dismissed plaintiffs'
claims.149 The court, however, gave plaintiffs a one-time opportunity to amend
their complaint.'50
D. Silicon Graphics II
In Silicon Graphics H,151 the sufficiency of recklessness under the Reform
Act took center stage. While the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, this time
making their allegations with greater specificity,152 the SEC filed an amicus
curiae brief, urging the court to reconsider its prior finding that allegations of
'negative internal reports"' found in plaintiffs' complaint. See id. at 95,966 n.1 1.
14 3 Id. at 95,966.
144 Id. (relying on Second Circuit law).
145 Id.
14 6 The court took judicial notice of defendants' Forms 3 and 4 and SGI's 1995 proxy
statement in making its evaluation of the stock sales. See id. The court rejected plaintiffs'
contention that the Forms 3 and 4 were misleading, noting that even under plaintiffs'
calculations there were millions of exercisable options available to defendants. See id. at 95,966
n.12.
147 Id.
148 See id. at 95,967. According to the court, this "consistency" suggested that the sales
were not motivated by an intent to defraud. See id. (citing In re Apple Computer, 886 F.2d
1109,1117 (9th Cir. 1989)).
149 See id.
150 See id. at 95,969.
151 In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. See. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
152 See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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recklessness were insufficient to plead scienter.1 53 In the view of the SEC, the
Reform Act had 'le[ft] unchanged the degree of scienter required for private
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. ' 154 After considering the SEC's
contentions and plaintiffs' amended complaint, the court again dismissed the
case.
155
In addressing the sufficiency of recklessness under the Reform Act's stricter
pleading standard, the court in Silicon Graphics fI reassessed the legislative
history that it had previously found to be "crystal clear." 156 Although asserting
that it believed its original interpretation was correct,157 the court nonetheless
made a subtle retreat from its earlier hard-line stance regarding recklessness,
ostensibly qualifying its previous holding and accepting a position materially
indistinguishable from that of the SEC.158
The court began its analysis by reviewing the state of the law prior to the
Reform Act. Although acknowledging that a majority of courts had accepted the
sufficiency of recklessness under section 10(b)159 and had defined recklessness in
a manner that was compatible with the Supreme Court's decision in
Hochfelder,160 the court focused its attention on the small minority of courts that,
153 See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 754.
154 Brief of Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 13, In re Silicon
Graphics, 970 F. Supp. 746. The SEC faulted the court in Silicon Graphics I for failing to make
the significant distinction between aprocedural pleading requirement and a substantive element
of a securities fraud violation. See id. at 8. According to the SEC, the Reform Act only purports
to establish a pleading standard and does not in any way attempt to alter the substantive
requirement of scienter, the court erred in that it "drew from a purely procedural provision the
incorrect conclusion that Congress had eliminated a well established substantive standard." Id.
The SEC also relied heavily on what it saw as the practical necessity of a recklessness
standard. See id. at 3. In the SEC's view, "such a standard is needed to protect investors and the
securities markets from fraudulent conduct and to protect the integrity of the disclosure
process." Id. The SEC noted that the recklessness standard discourages deliberate ignorance,
helps to ensure that defendants do not escape liability simply because of the difficulty of
proving knowledge or conscious intent based solely on circumstantial evidence (which often
must be relied on), and strengthens the deterrent effect of § 10(b). See id.
155 See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 768.
156 See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
157 See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 754 ("After reviewing the arguments and
the legal authorities, the court believes that its original interpretation was correct").
158 The court also appeared to retreat somewhat from its earlier hard-line position
regarding motive and opportunity by qualifying its conclusion that motive and opportunity are
insufficient: "Motive [and] opportunity,... may provide some evidence of intentional
wrongdoing, but are not alone sufficient unless the totality of the evidence creates a strong
inference of fraud." Id. at 757.
159
"[M]any circuit courts imposed Section 10(b) liability for recklessness-both
subjective and objective-prior to enactment of the SRA." Id. at 755. For cases accepting
recklessness under § 10(b), see supra note 49.
160 See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 755. In Hochfelder, the U.S. Supreme
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in its view, had caused a "conflict[ of] authority about what constitutes scienter
for purposes of section 10(b)."' 161 In particular, the court addressed what it
perceived as three lines of conflicting authority in the pre-Reform Act Second
Circuit: one line of cases allowed unqualified allegations of recklessness to be
sufficient to establish scienter (the "Lanza1 62 line"); a second line allowed
recklessness to support scienter only if coupled with a fiduciary duty (the "ROll 1 63
line'); and a third line required actual intent or circumstances implying actual
intent before finding scienter (the "Wechsler 64 line").165
Again, relying primarily on the Conference Committee Report, the court
found the legislative history consistent with an intent to reject the Lanza and Rolf
lines in favor of the stricter Wechsler line of Second Circuit cases. 16 6 In the
court's view, the rejection by both the House and Senate of similar amendments
that would have codified the Lanza line of cases and allowed liability for
unqualified recklessness, 167 coupled with the statement in a footnote to the
Conference Committee Report that it "chose not to include in the pleading
standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness," 168
indicated that Congress had embraced the only line of cases disallowing
allegations of recklessness to support scienter.169
Court stated that the term scienter encompassed an "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,"
but left open the possibility that recklessness would be sufficient. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12 (1976); see also supra notes 46-48 and accompanying
text. The court in Silicon Graphics H specifically referred to the definition of scienter articulated
by the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th
Cir. 1977), and applied by the Ninth Circuit in Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564,
1569 (9th Cir. 1990). See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 755. On the Sundstrand
definition, see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
161 See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 755. The court cited cases in which a
definition of recklessness was imposed that included "carelessness approaching indifference."
Id. (citing Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (lst Cir. 1978)).
162 Lanza v. Drexel & Co., Inc., 479 F2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
163 Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38,44 (2d Cir. 1978).
164 Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054, 1058 (2d Cir. 1984).
165 See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 755.
166 See id. at 756.
167 The court noted that both the original House bill and the Specter Amendment would
have imposed liability for "unqualified recklessness." Id.
168 H.. REP. No. 104-369, at41 n.23 (1995).
169 See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 756. Surprisingly, the court did
acknowledge that the legislative history was not entirely consistent. See id. at 756-57.
However, the court used this observation in an attempt to bolster its position, noting that the
inconsistencies made its firm reliance on the Conference Committee Report all the more
justified. See id. at 757. In the court's view, the inconsistent statements of individual
Congressmen revealed, at most, that legislators disagreed about what the Second Circuit
standard was and thus what codifying that standard would mean. See id. at 756. In any event,
compared to the Conference Committee Report, which is the "authoritative source for finding
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Based on its extensive analysis of the Reform Act's legislative history, the
court in Silicon Graphics H held that, "in order to state a private securities fraud
claim, plaintiffs must create a strong inference of knowing or intentional
misconduct.1 70 In contrast to its "circumstantial evidence of c6nscious behavior"
standard 171 articulated in Silicon Graphics I, however, the court's 'hVew" standard
included a significant caveat "Knowing or intentional misconduct includes
deliberate recklessness as described in Hollinger .... $172 Ironically, the Hollinger
standard is precisely the same standard that the SEC argued had been left
unchanged by the Reform Act 173
In addressing plaintiffs' amended complaint the court in Silicon Graphics H
found that plaintiffs had again failed to plead specific facts establishing a strong
inference of knowing or intentional conduct.174 In their amended complaint,
plaintiffs attempted to bolster their internal reports allegations by describing a
series of reports which were alleged to have discussed the negative problems
experienced by SGI.175 Specifically, the amended complaint described a 'Fiscal
Year 1996/Budgef' report and various monthly 'Flash," "Stop Ship," and follow-
up reports.
17 6
the Legislature's intent" and repr.esents "the considered and collective understanding of those
Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation," the court noted that the
statements of individual Congressman were both unreliable and irrelevant. Id. at 757 (citations
omitted).
170 Id. at 757.
171 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
172 In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 757.
173 The SEC argued that the Sundstrand standard was followed by most of the circuit
courts prior to the Reform Act and that the Reform Act left the recklessness standard intact. See
Brief of Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 13, In re Silicon Graphics,
970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997). The Ninth Circuit in Hollinger expressly adopted the
Sundstrand definition of recklessness. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564,
1569 (9th Cir. 1990).
174 See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 767.
175 See id. at 765.
176 See id. Plaintiffs' amended complaint provided the following details about these
reports:
(1) The Fiscal Year 1996 Plan/budget was completed in the spring of 1995, made various
projections regarding operations and financials, and discussed the areas which later
became problems for SGI;
(2) Defendants received regular daily and monthly reports detailing the company's
performance;
(3) Defendants received "flash reports" regarding sales and problems with the Indigo2
Workstation in early October, November, and December of 1995, and a "stop ship" report
in late September of 1995; and
(4) Another report detailed what steps employees were taking to fix the problems being
experienced with the Indigo2 Workstation.
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Although the court found these reports to be "more elaborate" than those
found in the original complaint, the court concluded that they were still "too
generic to create a strong inference of fraud under the [Reform Act]."'1 77
According to the court, in order to establish a strong inference of fraud and to
conform to the spirit of the standard,178 more details would have to be alleged:
"The allegations should include the titles of the reports, when they were prepared,
who prepared them, to whom they were directed, their content, and the sources
from which plaintiffs obtained this information." 179
Finally, in readdressing plaintiffs' reliance on defendants' stock sales in
attempting to create a strong inference of fraud, the court affirmed its previous
finding that the defendants' stock trading collectively did not amount to unusual
or suspicious sales.180 Unlike in Silicon Graphics I, however, the court conducted
an individual analysis of each defendant's trading. 181 Based on a comparison of
the sales to trading history, the court concluded that the sales of four of the six
named individual defendants did not, as a matter of law, raise a strong inference
See id. at 766-67.
177 Id. at 767 (emphasis added). The court noted that any large, well-run company
announcing"low earnings would be vulnerable to allegations ... that such reports exist and that
they show 'very poor' results." Id.
178 The court noted that to allow plaintiffs to go forward with these "general allegations"
would undermine the strengthened pleading standards and the Reform Act would lose its
meaning. See id.
179 Id. These very demanding requiremens imposed on the plaintiffs by the court in
Silicon Graphics II can be explained, at least in part, by the court's determination that plaintiffs'
complaint was based on information and belief. See id. Under § 21D(b)(1)(B) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, if a plaintiff's complaint is based on information and belief, the plaintiff
is required to "state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(1) (Supp. H 1996). In delineating what this required, the court looked to the legislative
history for guidance. The court noted that Representative Bryant had objected to the
information and belief pleading requirement because it required plaintiffs to set forth with
specificity at the beginning of the case "all information... [forming] the basis for the
allegations of the plaintiff, meaning any whistle-blower within a securities firm involved would
have to be uncovered in the pleading in the very, very beginning." In re Silicon Graphics, 970
F. Supp. at 763 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. H2848 (Mar. 8, 1995)). Representative Dingell
agreed with Representative Bryant's concern, noting that the pleading standard required a
plaintiff to "literally, in [the] pleadings, include the names of confidential informants,
employees, competitors, Government employees, members of the media, and others who would
have provided information leading to the filing of the case." Id. (quoting 141 CONG. REC.
H2849 (Mar. 8, 1995)). Because Congress rejected Representative Bryant's proposed
amendment that would have relaxed this requirement, the court reasoned "that plaintiffs must
plead precisely the sort of information described by [the Representatives]." See id. at 764.
180 See In re Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 768. The court also rejected plaintiffs'
evidentiary challenge to the court taking judicial notice of Defendants' SEC forms. See id. at
758-59.
181 See id at 768.
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of fraud.1 82 As to the sales of the other two named defendants, however, the court
held that, although not alone sufficient to raise a strong inference of fraud, their
stock sales could be considered as evidence of fraud if the plaintiffs could bolster
their claims regarding negative internal reports. 183 Accordingly, the court
provided plaintiffs leave to file a supplement to buttress these allegations. 184
V. ANALYSIS OF SILICON GRAPHICS
A. Recklessness
Although the Northern District of California in Silicon GraphicsH retreated
from its earlier holding regarding the sufficiency of recklessness under the
Reform Act's pleading standard and appears to have arrived at the correct
conclusion, the court's two decisions both suffered from the same basic flaw-
blind reliance on legislative history. Although one could struggle to try to attach
some form of methodological label to the court's approach to statutory
construction in the two Silicon Graphics decisions, such a pursuit is unnecessary.
The court's approach violates widely accepted, basic principles of statutory
construction, irrespective of the label one attaches to the approach. Although it
appears to have reached the correct result, the court's interpretation ignored the
text and structure of the Reform Act and misinterpreted the Act's legislative
history.
1. Textual Limits Prevent a Finding That Congress Changed the
Scienter Standard
A major problem with Silicon Graphics is the court's failure to sufficiently
evaluate the text of the Reform Act. By focusing exclusively on the legislative
history behind the enactment of section 21D(b)(2), a purely proceduralprovision,
the court overlooked the fact that section 21D(b)(2) does not in any way address
the substantive element of scienter. Section 21D(b)(2) merely imposes a
"heightened" pleading standard when a plaintiff is required to prove that a
182 See id. Defendant McCracken sold only 2.6% of his available stock and options,
defendant Baskett sold 7.7%, defendant Ramsay sold 4.1%, and defendant Sekimoto sold 6.9%.
See id. These sales were also consistent with past transactions. See id.
183 See id Defendant Kelly sold 43.6% of his available stocks and options, while
defendant Burgess sold 75.3%. See id. Neither Kelly nor Burgess had a significant trading
history with which to compare these transactions. See id.
184 See id. at 769. Plaintiffs declined to accept the court's invitation, arguing, inter alia,
that their original pleadings were sufficient. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. See. Litig., No.
C96-0393, 1996 WL 337580 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1997). The court subsequently dismissed
plaintiffs' case with prejudice. See id
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defendant acted with a particular state of mind in a securities fraud action; 185 it
says nothing about what state of mind is sufficient for imposing liability in such
actions. 186
One clear limit on the Supreme Court's willingness to consider legislative
history is the requirement that statements be "anchored" in the text of the
statute.187 As the D.C. Circuit stated in International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local Union No. 474, AFL-CIO v. NLRB: 188 "[C]ourts have no
authority to enforce principles gleaned solely from legislative history that ha[ve]
no statutory reference point."189 Clearly violating this principle, the court in
Silicon Graphics allowed the legislative history of the Reform Act,190 specifically
a single footnote to the Conference Committee Report, 191 to determine what the
text never purported to address-whether recklessness was sufficient to satisfy
the scienter requirement in securities fraud actions. Had the court properly
analyzed the text of section 21D(b)(2), it would have discovered that "Congress
only sought to strengthen pleading standards, not to change the substantive
standard for scienter."1 92
185 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1996); supra Part lI.B.
186 As noted in Part HA, supra, every circuit court addressing the issue prior to the
Reform Act had found that a showing of recklessness was sufficient under § 10(b) and lOb-5.
See supra note 49. The Supreme Court has noted that Congress is presumed to be aware of
long-standing judicial interpretations when it amends a statute. See Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,698-99 (1979).
187 See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994) ("We are not aware of any
case... in which we have given authoritative weight to a single passage of legislative history
that is in no way anchored in the text of the statute."). Professor Coffee spoke of this limitation
shortly after the enactment of the Reform Act, specifically referring to the Act's new pleading
standard: "[T]here is at least one clear limitation on the majority's willingness to consider
legislative history: any such statement must be 'anchored' to the text of the statute." Coffee,
supra note 73, at 981.
188 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
189 Id. at 712 (emphasis omitted).
190 The Court, in both Silicon Graphics I and II, placed significant reliance on the
Conference Committee Report and President Clinton's Veto Message. See supra notes 122-32;
166-70 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 128.
192 Brief of Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 8, In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997); see also In re Stratosphere Corp.
Sec. Litig., I F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1104 (D. Nev. 1998) ('Ihis court does not believe the Congress
would abolish the well established use of recklessness as permissible scienter under the
securities laws without expressly stating so in the language of the statute.").
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2. Analysis of the Reform Act's Structure Indicates that
Recldessness Survives
A structural analysis of the Reform Act reveals that the elimination of the
recklessness standard would create an absurd result. The Reform Act, in new
section 21E of the 1934 Act, creates a "safe harbor" from liability for forward-
looking statements. 193 Subject to certain exclusions, 194 a person may no longer be
held liable in a private securities action for any forward-looking statement that is
accompanied by certain cautionary language, unless the statement is proved to
have been made with actual knowledge that it was false or misleading.195 In sum,
section 21E alters the scienter requirement for certain forward-looking statements
to actual knowledge, eliminating liability for recklessness.
To give significance to section 21E, the provision must be read against the
backdrop of a recklessness standard. To find that section 21D(b)(2) alters the
general standard of scienter by eliminating recklessness essentially renders
section 21E meaningless, 196 for there would be no need to single out certain
statements for protection with a heightened level of scienter if the basic standard
of scienter had already eliminated recklessness.197 A basic principle of statutory
construction requires courts to read statutes in a manner that gives significance to
every provision.198 By ignoring this principle, the court in Silicon Graphics
unnecessarily struggled with the Reform Act's legislative history.
19 3 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 210, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (Supp.
H 1996); supra note 80.
194 First, in order to be covered by its protections, § 21E requires that the person making
the forward-looking statement be the issuer, or someone acting on behalf of the issuer. See 15
U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (Supp. 11 1996). Second, § 21E(b) provides specific exclusions for, inter
alia, statements made by issuers convicted within the previous three years of criminal violations
of the securities laws and statements made in connection with tender offers and initial public
offerings. See id. § 78u-5(b).
195 See id.
196 In fact, it 'ustrates Congress' desire to require actual knowledge only for forward-
looking statements." Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 63, at 923.
197 As the SEC has argued, "The only provision of the Reform Act that purported to alter
the scienter standard in private actions under the Exchange Act was Section 21E of the
Exchange Act." Brief of Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 7, In re
Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997). At least one court has
noted that "where Congress intended to establish knowing conduct as a prerequisite for liability,
it did so explicitly within the PSLRA, such as providing a safe harbor for forward looking
statements." In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1104 (D. Nev. 1998).
198 The Supreme Court has recognized that it is a "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation
that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant." Kungys v. United States, 485
U.S. 759,778 (1988) (plurality opinion).
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3. The Court Misinterpreted the Reform Act's Legislative History
Although reliance on legislative history is misplaced given the clarity of the
text and structure of the Reform Act, the Reform Act's legislative history
nonetheless clearly indicates that liability for recklessness was not being
eliminated. This makes the court's struggle in Silicon Graphics all the more
puzzling. While the court in Silicon Graphics placed significant reliance on an
obscure statement in a footnote to the Conference Committee Report, the court
overlooked the fact that early drafts of the Reform Act expressly required actual
knowledge of falsity, but these drafts were rejected.199 As the court itself stated in
Silicon Graphics , this "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress
intended a result that it expressly declined to enact."200
B. Standardfor Pleading Scienter
In Silicon Graphics, the Northern District of California held that, under the
Reform Act, facts showing a motive and opportunity to commit fraud are no
longer sufficient to plead the requisite "strong inference" of fraud.2 1 This
interpretation of section 21D(b)(2) represents a dramatic departure from prior
cases.202 Furthermore, a full evaluation of the text and legislative history of the
Reform Act renders the court's interpretation highly questionable. Essentially,
although it could be argued that the court was justified in seeking guidance from
the legislative history, the court's finding that motive and opportunity is no longer
sufficient resulted from reading too much into legislative history that was both
ambiguous and inconsistent.
1. Textualist Criticism
From a purely textualist approach, the court's reliance on legislative history
was unjustified. The "strong inference" language adopted by Congress had an
established meaning in Second Circuit case law when the Reform Act was
19 9 See Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 63, at 923.
200 In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. See. Liig., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 99,325 at 95,962 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996), available in 1996 WL 664639 (quoting
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974)). Congress has explicitly stated
since the enactment of the Reform Act that it did not in any way "intend to alter standards of
liability under the Exchange Act" HR. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).
201 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
202 See, e.g., Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (interpreting the
Reform Act to adopt the Second Circuit standard); Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp.
1246, 1251-53 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (stating that the motive and opportunity test are not eliminated);




enacted.2 03 Based on the principle that Congress is presumed to be aware of long-
standing judicial interpretations when it amends a statute2 04 it could be argued
that the text is clear and, therefore, that the legislative history cannot be used to
contradict the unambiguous text adopting the Second Circuit's standard.2 05 This
is the approach that a few courts have taken with respect to the issue, concluding
solely from the text that the Reform Act codifies the Second Circuit standard in its
entirety.206
A textualist approach produces a result that, arguably, best comports with the
purpose of the Reform Act's heightened pleading standard.207 Adoption of the
Second Circuit's "strong inference" standard represents a substantial heightening
of the pleading standard in some circuits, particularly in the Ninth Circuit. 08
Thus, the desire to impose harsher barriers to the filing of meritless lawsuits is
satisfied. Furthermore, codification of the Second Circuit's established standard,
which has been developed and applied extensively by courts throughout the
Second Circuit, is consistent with the purpose of providing uniformity in pleading
standards.209 As further discussed infra, the major problem with concluding that
the Reform Act did not codify the Second Circuit standard is discerning any
concrete standard that can be applied in a uniform manner.
The textualist approach clearly has its merits. Unfortunately, the large
percentage of district courts interpreting section 21D(b)(2) have relied on the
legislative history for guidance.210 In addition, although the textualist approach
203 See supra Part II.B.1.
204 See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,698-99 (1979).
205 "The Supreme Court has held that where statutory text 'contains a phrase that is
unambiguous-that has a clearly accepted meaning in both legislative and judicial practice-
we do not permit it to be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual legislators or
committees during the course of the enactment process."' Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 63, at
919 (citing West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,98-99 (1991)).
206 See, e.g., Bryant v. Apple South, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Ga. 1998) (noting
that the Reform Act is clear on its face and so no support from the legislative history is
necessary); Zeid v. Kimberly, 930 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (accepting the Second Circuit
standard with little discussion).
207 See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text
208 The Ninth Circuit's pleading standard was viewed as the most lenient and permitted a
plaintiff to aver scienter generally. See supra Part II32.
209 See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) ('The House and Senate hearings on
securities litigation reform included testimony on the need to establish uniform and more
stringent pleading requirements .... ).
210 See, e.g., Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 48 (D. Mass. 1997)
("Reviewing the text of the PSLRA, this Court is left with no guidance as to the proper
interpretation of the term 'strong inference' of scienter. As a result, the Court must look to the
legislative history."); see also Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1251-53 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (relying on Conference Committee Report and President's veto message).
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has its supporters,21 1 many courts, as well as a majority of the Justices of the
Supreme Court, afford great weight to legislative history in most
circumstances. 2 12 Thus, by consulting the legislative history, the Northern District
of California seems to have taken a somewhat "dynamic," but arguably
legitimate, approach to statutory construction.
2. Excessive Reliance on the Legislative History
In concluding that evidence of motive and opportunity is insufficient to
satisfy the Reform Act's strong inference requirement the Northern District of
California in Silicon Graphics takes certain statements in the legislative history
beyond their intended meaning. Although there is strong support in the legislative
history to indicate that Congress did not intend to codify the Second Circuit
pleading standard in its entirety,2 13 the legislative history provides little clear
guidance as to what the precise contours of the new standard might be.2 14 Despite
this, the court "discovered" a concrete standard in the legislative history, which
resulted in an interpretation of section 21D(b)(2) that Congress clearly did not
intend.
The court in Silicon Graphics seems to have concluded correctly that
Congress intended to strengthen the pleading standard beyond that of the Second
Circuit. The Conference Committee Report, which is arguably the most reliable
source of legislative history,2 15 makes it unmistakably clear that Congress
intended to strengthen its pleading standard.216 In addition, President Clinton's
veto of the Reform Act was predicated, to a large extent, on an understanding that
211 The most prominent advocate of the textualist approach is, of course, Justice Scalia.
For a discussion of Justice Scalia's approach to statutory construction, see Stephen A. Plass,
The llusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93 (1995); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of
Statutoy Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990).
212 See Coffee, supra note 73, at 981 (citing Bank One Chicago, N.A., v. Midwest Bank
& Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264,272-74 (1996)).
213 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995); supra note 127 and accompanying
text.
2 14 The Reform Act does not indicate how much stricter the new standard is or what kinds
of allegations are sufficient under the new standard. This is troubling given that a major purpose
of the Reform Act was to settle a conflict among the circuits and to provided uniformity in
pleading standards. Again, this lends credence to the textual approach, which provides for such
a uniform and concrete standard.
215 See, e.g., Demby v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the
conference committee report is "the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent besides
the statute itself').
216 See H.R REP. No. 104-69, at 41 (1995) ('Because the Conference Committee intends
to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's
case law interpreting this pleading standard.').
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Congress was going beyond the Second Circuit standard. 217 Thus, Congress's
subsequent override of the President's veto provides strong additional support for
the court's conclusion.
Contrary to the court's finding, however, the legislative history does not
suggest an outright rejection of motive and opportunity. The court relied on a
statement in a footnote to the Conference Committee Report that indicates that
Congress did not intend to codify language relating to motive and opportunity21 8
According to the court, this statement indicates that only circumstantial evidence
of scienter suffices under the Reform Act's pleading standard.2 19 This conclusion,
however, is based on flawed reasoning, for the failure to codify does not
necessarily indicate that Congress meant to reject motive and opportunity as per
se insufficient 220 Instead, as certain statements in the legislative history suggest,
Congress simply decided to omit the guidance.221
The court's conclusion regarding motive and opportunity was also based on
an incomplete and inconsistent reading of other aspects of the Reform Act's
2 17 See supra note 130.
2 18 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that the court
initially found that this same footnote suggested that recklessness was eliminated as a basis of
liability. See supra Part V.A.3. The court, of course, later retreated from this conclusion. See
supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
2 19 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
220 See Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1311 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (CThe footnote, embedded as it is in the legislative history and not the body of the
statute... does not indicate that Congress chose to specifically disapprove the motive and
opportunity test.!). There are a number of other plausible explanations for why Congress
decided not to include the motive and opportunity test in the text of the statute. For instance, the
SEC argued that "[flootnote 23 merely explains the result of the Conference Committee's
decision not to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting the pleading standard." Brief of
Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 12, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997). Perhaps more persuasive is the suggestion that the
Specter Amendment provided for a motive and opportunity test that failed to include important
qualifications needed to accurately reflect the most recent Second Circuit cases. See Brief of
Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 9, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. See.
Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997), appeal docketed, No. 97-16240 (9th Cir. July 10,
1997) (noting that recent Second Circuit cases required plaintiffs to show a "particularized
economic benefit that defendants could rationally expect to achieve through the fraudulent
scheme alleged").
221 Senator Dodd, for example, indicated that, in rejecting the Specter Amendment,
"[w]e ... left out the guidance. That does not mean you disregard it." 141 CONG. REC. S19068
(daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995). Several district courts have recently adopted this interpretation. See,
e.g., Sturm v. Marriott Marquis Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that the
Second Circuit's standard of motive and opportunity is 'neither incorporated in nor repealed by
the Reform Act"); Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d
1345, 1359 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that the Reform Act did not establish a rigid, formalistic
test, but requires that courts examine plaintiff's allegations in their entirety to determine if they
permit a strong inference of fraudulent intent).
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legislative history. During consideration of what became new section 21D(b)(2),
an amendment was adopted that would have expressly codified the Second
Circuit standard relating to motive and opportunity.222 Although the court placed
significance on the deletion of this "clarifying amendment,"223 the court
overlooked the fact that the amendment would also have expressly codified the
other prong of the Second Circuit standard. 224 Thus, when the Conference
Committee deleted the clarifying amendment, the Committee also deleted the
language regarding circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior.225 It is
entirely inconsistent for the Court to find that the motive and opportunity prong
was expressly rejected as insufficient and, at the same time, articulate a standard
requiring circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior.
If Congress had intended to adopt a precise test for what is sufficient to
satisfy the new "strong inference' standard, one would expect that Congress
would have included this in the text of the Act. The text of section 21D(b)(2),
however, provides no such guidance for applying the "strong inference" standard.
Nonetheless, the court in Silicon Graphics takes certain statements in the
legislative history to their literal extremes in order to "discover" the precise
contours of the Reform Act's "strong inference" standard. Not only does this
result in an interpretation of section 21D(b)(2) that Congress clearly did not
intend, but it also provides a standard for pleading scienter that effectively
undermines the primary purpose of securities fraud actions.
C. Striking an Imbalance
The overriding purpose of the federal securities laws is the protection of
2 22 See Amend. 1485, S. 240, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995) (the Specter Amendment).
223 The court also placed some significance on the Conference Committee Report's
subsequent reference to this deletion. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text
224 The Specter Amendment would have provided in the text of the statute:
(2) Strong Inference of Fraudulent Intent-for purposes of paragraph (1), a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind may be established
either.
(A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive and opportunity to
commit fraud; or
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant.
141 CONG. REC. 59222 (June 28, 1995), reprinted in Brief of Securities and Exchange
Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 11 n.16, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp.
746 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
225 See Brief of Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 12, In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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investors. 226 Courts and commentators alike have recognized that private
securities fraud actions, such as those brought under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5, have become the primary tool for effectuating this purpose.2 27 The
effectiveness of private securities fraud actions in achieving their purpose depends
upon their ability to remedy violations that occur.2 28 The courts have been
mindful of this when developing the parameters of securities fraud actions,
recognizing that, in order for investors to be protected, the courtroom doors must
remain open to victims of securities fraud violations.2 29
Although private securities fraud actions attempt to protect investors by
deterring fraud and remedying violations that occur, the courts have recognized
that such actions can pose a significant threat of abuse if left unchecked. 230 With
private securities fraud actions, there is a threat that the litigation process will be
used to "extract[ ] undeserved settlements" by prolonging the discovery process
and thereby imposing substantial costs on innocent defendants.2 31 Thus, courts
must be mindful of the conflicting interests implicated by securities fraud action,
for an inevitable tension exists between deterring abuse on the one hand and
ensuring that victims of fraud are given a sufficient opportunity to obtain redress
on the other2 32
The Reform Act can be seen as an attempt by Congress to strike a balance
between these two conflicting interests.2 33 Essentially, the Reform Act was
enacted because Congress believed that the courts were not striking a proper
balance.234 While the existing procedural framework was keeping the courtroom
226 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
2 27 See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 104 (1995) ("Private securities litigation is an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses ... "); supra notes
37-38 and accompanying text.
228 See, e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993) ("IThere
is the interest of deterring fraud in the securities markets and remedying it when it occurs.).
2 29 For instance, in Roifv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), the
Second Circuit recognized the practical implications of not allowing liability based on
recklessness: "[It] would for all intents and purposes disembowel the private cause of action
under Section 10(b)'Id. at 47.
2 30 See In re Time Warner, 9 F3d at 263.
231 See id.
232 On the one hand, the interest of the federal securities laws in deterring fraud and
remedying violations requires courts to recognize that plaintiffs are often unable to provide
substantial detail without an opportunity to conduct discovery. See id. On the other hand, the
interest in deterring frivolous lawsuits and preventing "undeserved settlements" requires courts
to enforce certain procedural protections in order to separate the frivolous claims from the valid
ones. See id.
2 33 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
234 Prior to the Reform Act, the amount of protection provided by pleading standards
differed considerably among circuits. As discussed in Part II.B, supra, this inconsistency was
most pronounced between the Second and Ninth Circuits and resulted from an inconsistent
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door open to victims of securities fraud, it was also letting in an unacceptable
number of frivolous law suits. Increasingly, plaintiffs were bringing unfounded
claims, abusing the discovery process, and forcing "unwarranted settlements.'2 35
In Congress's view, this was a result of insufficient procedural protections. Thus,
the Reform Act imposed a number of procedural protections, including a
discovery stay,2 36 stricter pleading standards, and more potent sanctions for
abusive practices, in an attempt to strike a more proper balance2 37
In Silicon Graphics, the court concluded that evidence establishing a motive
and opportunity to commit fraud is per se insufficient to satisfy the Reform Act's
"heightened" pleading standard.238 This represents a substantial holding with
severe implications given the fact that, under the pre-Reform Act Second Circuit
standard, allegations of motive and opportunity represented an important
mechanism for withstanding a motion to dismiss.2 39 From a practical standpoint,
this was because the proof required to establish motive and opportunity was most
consistent with the type of information typically available to a victim of securities
fraud prior to discovery.
Where direct or circumstantial evidence of the defendant's level of scienter
was lacking, a plaintiff could allege that defendant had both the motive and the
opportunity to commit fraud.2 40 In order to prove motive, a plaintiff had to allege
that the defendant stood to gain concrete benefits from the misrepresentations or
application of Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements. The Ninth Circuit applied a pleading standard
that provided only a minimal procedural barrier to surviving motions to dismiss. This resulted
from a literal interpretation of Rule 9(b)'s requirements for pleading scienter, which allowed a
plaintiff to aver scienter generally. See supra note 63-67 and accompanying text. The Second
Circuit, on the other hand, applied a rather stringent pleading standard that required plaintiffs to
plead scienter by alleging "facts that g[a]ve rise to a 'strong inference' of fraudulent intent." In
re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268. The Ninth Circuit's standard, although arguably based on a
strained reading of Rule 9(b), resulted from a conscious attempt to strike a balance between the
two competing interests. See id. at 263--64 (discussing the balancing of interests).
235 Congress was prompted by a number of perceived abuses in securities litigation. See
supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
236 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)
(Supp. I 1996). Under § 21D(b)(3) of the 1934 Act, "all discovery and other proceedings shall
be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss" in private securities fraud actions. Id.
237 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text Although it is not entirely clear, it
appears that the court in Silicon Graphics II may have retreated somewhat from its initial hard-
line position. See supra note 158.
239 Victims of fraud often cannot obtain "hard" evidence of fraudulent intent until they
have had an opportunity to conduct discovery. See In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268 ("Victims
of fraud often are unable to detail their allegations until they have had some opportunity to
conduct discovery of those reasonably suspected of having perpetrated a fraud.").
240 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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nondisclosures.2 41 For example, a plaintiff could show that the defendants had
sold a substantial amount of stock after making the allegedly false statements. In
order to prove opportunity, a plaintiff was required to show that the defendants
had the means to bring about concrete benefits 242 To satisfy this, the courts
required a plaintiff to demonstrate that defendants were well positioned to carry
out the fraud in that they possessed a position of trust and authority.2 43
In holding that evidence establishing a motive and opportunity to commit
fraud is insufficient to plead a strong inference of fraud under section 21D(b)(2),
the court in Silicon Graphics undermined the balance struck by Congress in the
Reform Act. The court's holding will require, in all securities fraud actions, that
plaintiffs allege facts constituting circumstantial evidence of "deliberate
recklessness" or conscious behavior. 44 This will require, for example, that
plaintiffs provide details regarding negative internal reports indicating that
defendants knew or should have known that their statements were false or
misleading.2 45 Unfortunately, in many securities fraud cases, this type of
information will be exclusively within the knowledge and control of the
defendants. Furthermore, because the Reform Act requires courts to stay all
discovery pending a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs will frequently not have access
to this information.2 46 Thus, while ostensibly preventing frivolous lawsuits,
requiring circumstantial evidence in all instances will effectively prevent a
number of potentially meritorious securities fraud claims from surviving a motion
to dismiss.
The court's interpretation of section 21D(b)(2) in Silicon Graphics cannot be
reconciled with the purposes of the Reform Act. By eliminating the only viable
method of pleading scienter available to many securities fraud plaintiffs, the
court's decision effectively leaves many investors unprotected and without
sufficient opportunity to remedy fraud when it occurs. In light of the strong
interest of the federal securities laws in protecting investors and deterring fraud, it
is hard to imagine that Congress intended to create such a result.
241 See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Motive would
entail concrete benefits that could be realized by one or more of the false statements and
wrongful nondisclosures alleged?).
24 2 Id. ("Opportunity would entail the means and likely prospect of achieving concrete
benefits by the means alleged").
24 3 See Powers v. British Vita, P.L.C., 57 F.3d 176, 185 (2d Cir. 1995).
244 See supra note 62. This "second prong" of the Second Circuit standard is generally
more difficult to satisfy. Id.
245 This was attempted without success in Silicon Graphics. See supra notes 140-41 and
accompanying text.




VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A 'BALANCED" INTERPRETATION
Although every district court now appears to accept that the Reform Act did
not eliminate recklessness from the definition of scienter, the courts are sharply
divided regarding the precise contours of the section 21D(b)(2) pleading standard.
Although a few courts have taken the position that the Reform Act merely
codifies the Second Circuit standard in its entirety,247 the legislative history
clearly indicates that this is not the case.248 Nor does the text or legislative history
support the position taken by the court in Silicon Graphics that Congress intended
to eliminate the motive and opportunity test by rendering it per se insufficient to
satisfy the "strong inference" pleading standard 249
The text and legislative history of the Reform Act are most consistent with an
interpretation that completely divorces the "strong inference" pleading standard
from any concrete test.250 While there is clear language in the Reform Act's
legislative history indicating that section 21D(b)(2) is not merely a codification of
the Second Circuit standard, there is insufficient guidance in the Act to allow a
court to piece together a test delineating what facts are sufficient to satisfy this
new pleading standard. Upon a thorough evaluation of the Reform Act, it
becomes clear that Congress only addressed the standard in the Reform Act,
leaving the determination as to what will be sufficient under this standard to the
courts.
25 1
Such an interpretation of section 21D(b)(2) is not only faithful to the text and
247 See supra note 206.
248 See supra note 214-17 and accompanyiig text.
249 See supra note 218-25 and accompanying text.
2 50 When considering the pleading standard separate from the facts that are sufficient to
establish a "strong inference" of fraudulent intent, the text and legislative history of§ 21D(b)(2)
begin to make a great deal more sense. Essentially, § 21D(bX2) only provides for a heightened
pleading standard; it says nothing about what types of facts are sufficient to satisfy this standard.
251 A few courts have interpreted § 21D(bX2) in this manner. For example, the Eastern
District of New York found that "the PSLRA does not delineate what facts suffice to establish a
'strong inference' of fraudulent intent. Instead, Congress... bestowed such duty to interpret
upon the courts." In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 200 (E.D.N.Y.
1997); see also Sturm v. Marriott Marquis Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. 1998); Queen
Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (D. Colo.
1998).
Additional support for this interpretation was provided by Congress in a Conference
Report to the Security Litigation Standards Act of 1998. See H.R. REP. No. 105-803 (1998). In
its Joint Explanatory Statement the Conference Committee emphasized that the Reform Act
did not make "any attempt to define [the] state of mind" required by the Reform Act's "strong
inference" standard. See id. The court in In re Health Management, Inc. Securities Litigation
held that a plaintiff is not restricted in the ways he may attempt to satisfy this standard.
According to the court, "A plaintiff can satisfy this burden by pleading motive and opportunity,
conscious misbehavior, recklessness or by impressing upon the court a novel legal theory."
Health Management, 970 F. Supp. at 201.
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legislative history of the Reform Act, but it is also consistent with the purposes of
the Reform Act and federal securities laws-it strikes a proper balance between
the competing interests implicated in securities fraud actions. By recognizing that
the "strong inference" standard is stronger than even the Second Circuit's
standard, the interpretation furthers the goal of deterring frivolous lawsuits. This
is not necessarily accomplished, however, at the expense of investors with valid
securities fraud actions, because the courts enjoy the flexibility to determine what
types of facts suffice to establish a strong inference of fraudulent intent. Thus, the
courts are given the task of molding the standard to maintain a proper balance of
interests.
The decision by the Northern District of California in Silicon Graphics is
certainly not the last judicial attempt at interpreting section 21D(b)(2)'s
heightened pleading standard. The Silicon Graphics case is currently awaiting
appellate review in the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile, the district courts continue their
struggle to come up with an interpretation that is consistent with the Reform Act's
text, structure, and legislative history, while still maintaining faithul to the
purposes of the Reform Act and the federal securities laws.
